The purpose of this paper is to investigate the difference in assets between
the companies that have agency problem and no agency problem. Agency
problem in this paper is peroxided by cash flow right leverage. Leverage
indicates the difference between control rights and cash flow of controlling
shareholder. If the control rights are greater than cash flow rights, it
indicates there are agency problem in the company. It happens because
the control of the controlling shareholder in the company is more dominant
than the shareholder’s claim to the company. This condition is incentive to
motivate the controlling shareholder to extract the company’s assets for
his/her private benefit. This is attributable to the controlling shareholder
protected by control rights. If the cash flow rights are high and as well as
the control rights, it indicates that there is no agency problem in the
company. This condition indicates that the claims value of the controlling
shareholder against the company’s profit is same as the control of the
controlling shareholder. To prove empirical evidence, this paper uses the
sample of the manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesian Stock
Exchange during the period 2000-2007. The result of analysis of this paper
shows that there are differences in assets between the existing agency
problem and no agency problem. The assets of the company which exist
the agency problem is lower than the assets of the company which is not
agency problem. Therefore, the hypothesis of this study is supported.